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Commentary

New Wine in Old Bottles:
Certificate of Need Enters the 1990s
Robert B. Hackey
University of Massachusetts

Abstract Although state certificate-of-need(CON) programs have been the subject
of intense criticism over the past decade, recent evidence suggests that CON programs may be more effective than commonly believed. While many state programs
have yielded disappointing results, the CON process can also be used to achieve
other important policy objectives, such as increasing access to care for the uninsured
and increasing lay participation in health policy planning. In sum, rather than fading
away after the termination of federal support for health planning in 1986, state CON
programs are poised to assume new roles during the 1990s.

After a decade in which regulatory solutions to rising health care costs,
and certificate-of-need (CON) regulation in particular, fell out of favor
among academics, policymakers, and health providers, health planning
and capital expenditure controls have resurfaced on the health policy
agenda in the 1990s. Two articles in this issue of the Journal of Health
Politics, Policy and Law take a look at these trends. In their study, Charles
and DeMaio offer a fresh look at citizen participation-once an integral
part of CON regulation in the U. S.,but now a largely overlooked topicwhile Campbell and Fournier discuss the impact of CON on the provision of indigent hospital care. Together, they provide an opportunity to
reexamine the future prospects of health planning and certificate-of-need
regulation in the United States. In the eyes of their critics, CON programs
have failed to control costs, stifled competition (Burda 1991), and had
little impact on access to health care for either the poor or geographically
underserved regions (Sloan 1988). Indeed, according to Bovbjerg ( 1988:
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 1993. Copyright 0 1993 by
Duke University.
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206), “the evidence that CON in practice has accomplished any useful
social objectives is very weak.”
Current perceptions of CON’S failure as a cost control strategy, however, are largely based on assessmentsof program performance during the
1970s; more recent evidence suggests that the performance of many CON
programs has improved over time. Furthermore, despite their emphasis on
controlling costs, CON programs have always had multiple goals. Campbell and Fournier’s discussion of Florida’s CON program, coupled with
experience from other states, suggests that CON programs may serve an
important role in increasing access to health care. Finally, the growing
influence of the “outcomes movement” (Epstein 1990) on both payers
and providers in recent years points to a new role for state CON programs
in the 1990s, for recent studies of the appropriate utilization of health
care services offer improved guidance for regulators in determining the
“need” for new health care facilities.
The Limitationsof CON as a Cost ControlStrategy

Widespread dissatisfaction with the cost control record of state CON programs produced a large range of responses among the states after the expiration of Pub. L. No. 93-641: twelve states abandoned CON altogether,
while some raised the threshold for CON review and others strengthened
their programs. No state, however, has abolished CON since 1989 (Burda
1991), and at least one state (New Jersey) has taken steps to recreate local
planning agencies to review capital projects (Brandon 1992).
On the surface, Campbell and Fournier’s claim that “protecting profits
is the core of what CON regulation is all about” is consistent with studies
of entry regulation in other industries where business groups either supported regulation as a means to avert destructive competition or “captured” government regulatory agencies (Stigler 1971; Lowi 1969). Upon
closer inspection, however, the authors’ contention that states adopted
CON programs for reasons besides controlling costs is not persuasive.
Although hospitals often supported CON review as a less onerous process
than prospective rate-setting programs, several states that pioneered CON
legislation prior to the passage of federal health planning legislation in
1974 were also early leaders in hospital rate regulation (e.g. Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island). Confronted by rapidly
escalating Medicaid costs, state governments seized upon CON as an imperfect but easily implemented tool to control the explosion of hospital
capital expenditures and state Medicaid budgets in the late 1960s. Rather
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than accommodatingproviders’ interests, both CON and hospital rate setting programs are examples of what Brown (1982) labels “rationalizing
politics,” as state governments sought new ways to cope with the fiscal
consequences of expanding entitlement programs and endemic inflation
in the health sector.
Early assessments of program performance generally concluded that
CON had little impact on overall hospital cost inflation, but more recent
evidence suggests that the performance of many programs improved over
time, particularly in states with a strong commitment to controlling costs
(Donahue et al. 1992; Morone 1990; Scott et al. 1987).’In part, the perceived failure of CON is the result of unrealistic expectations. Federal
health planning initiativesunder Pub. L. No. 93-641 placed too much reliance on indirect approaches to controlling costs (e.g., capital expenditure
controls), reflecting Morone’s (1990: 272) observation that “when the incoherent American state faces vexing problems, it reflexively musters up
[the] hope of rationalization without fundamental change.” Since CON
programs must cope with multiple, often conflicting goals (Brown 1983)
and intense opposition from both providers and local communities, the
inability of state regulators to reduce system-wide hospital expenditures
(Sloan 1988) is not surprising. However, the experiences of several states
that implemented capital expenditure caps over the past decade suggests
that CON’Slimitations as a cost control strategy is related to “the lack of
competition for a limited pool of resources” (Young 1991: 272). Under an
open-ended CON review process, an unlimited number of projects could
be approved if applicants could demonstrate that the proposed services
were “needed.” A ceiling on capital expenditures, however, forces decision makers to prioritize programs and choose those projects which are
most beneficial (Young 1991; Donahue et al. 1992). Since the merits of
each institution’s application are judged relative to others, the implementation of a capital cap creates a zero-sum game for providers, in which
the approval of one project automatically reduces the funds available for
others.
Even in the absence of a capital cap, however, a singular focus on
the rate of project denials or the savings in capital and operating costs
associated with rejected CON applications understates the impact of capital expenditure controls on providers’ behavior. Since the deliberations
that accompany the CON review process often lead to concessions by
1. See Sloan 1988 for an excellent review of evaluations of state CON programs’ performance
during the 1970s.
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providers, modifications of proposed projects offer a viable alternative
to achieving regulators’ desired objectives (e.g. , expanding care for the
uninsured ,lowering operating costs by requiring a higher equity contribution by applicants). Furthermore, as Tierney et al. (1982) argue, effective
communication between state regulatory agencies and providers should
minimize the number of denials. The existence of CON may also deter
providers from submitting weak proposals for review, for “few institutions are likely to expend the time, energy, and money to traverse the
complex certificate of need process for a project that cannot withstand the
test of public scrutiny” (Tierney et al. 1982: 178).
CON and the Uninsured

By the mid-1980s, the health policy agenda had changed: while controlling costs remained the central goal of both state and federal policymakers, the growing number of persons without health insurance and
hospitals’ mounting fiscal losses from uncompensated care brought concerns about access to health care back to the health policy agenda. While
other states developed uncompensated care pools or all-payer rate-setting
programs or flirted with universal health insurance, Florida’s legislature
favored implicit rather than explicit solutions to the state’s growing indigent care problem (Jones 1989). In Florida, the ability of hospitals to
fund indigent care through cost shifting was limited by extensive penetration by HMOs into the market, an above-average number of for-profit
hospitals, and Medicare’s status as the largest third-party payer in the
state. As a result, Campbell and Fournier argue that “hospital regulators
had a conscious policy of protecting the interests of hospitals that provide
large amounts of indigent care” during the 1980s. Although Campbell and
Fournier claim that regulators’ emphasis on the provision of indigent care
limited competition in the state’s hospital industry, the practice reflects
the desire of state officials to preserve access to care for the uninsured
using the institutional resources at their disposal.
Two issues, however, limit the authors’ ability to generalize their finding to the CON programs of other states. First, since Florida’s threshold
for CON review ($1 million for capital costs, $500,000 for operating
costs) is higher than many other states, projects subject to review in other
states may be excluded from the analysis. Second, the authors’ empirical
analysis does not control for the effect on the CON process of a hospital’s
teaching status or the institution’s status as a sole community provider;
teaching hospitals, in particular, typically offer a wider range of services
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and have different capital requirements than smaller community hospitals. Since a number of studies have documented that teaching hospitals
provide a disproportionate amount of uncompensated care, the authors’
observation that CON approvals are “a reward to hospitals providing large
amounts of indigent care” may reflect a bias toward teaching institutions afliliated with university medical schools rather than discrimination
against hospitals with a poor record of providing care for the indigent (see
Sloan 1988).
In the absence of other institutional levers, CON offered officials in
Florida both a carrot and a stick to modify providers’ behavior. While
Campbell and Fournier lament the fact that regulators possessed “unprecedented power to pursue objectives other than cost control,” Florida’s
CON legislation (and that of other states) offers multiple criteria for
policymakers to use in making decisions. Indeed, as the authors note,
the criteria for project review described in the rules and regulations governing the CON process “enumerate roughly a dozen aims that are unweighted and potentially conflicting.” Confronted by a growing indigent
care problem and restrictive Medicaid eligibility requirements, public officials in Florida used their regulatory mandate to encourage hospitals to
provide care for the uninsured.
Outcomes Assessment and CON

A renewed emphasis on the assessment of patient outcomes also points
to new roles for state CON programs over the next decade, for, as Relman (1988: 1221) notes, “the chief cause of the cost crisis [in American
medicine] is not so much the price as the ever-increasing volume and
intensity of medical services being provided in outpatient settings and
hospitals.” As the cost of health care continued to climb, business groups
and third-party payers have increasingly sought to link reimbursement to
patient outcomes. Businesses’ interest in “buying right” was also sparked
by the appearance of studies that documented considerable geographic
2. The authors’ claim that the principal purpose of CON was to avoid unnecessary duplication of services and to control costs is inconsistent with their earlier observation that Florida’s
CON statute did not prioritize among criteria for project review. In addition, several other states
have incorporated the level of uncompensated care into the CON process for both profit and
nonprofit hospitals (see Sloan 1988).
3. For example, the number of persons undergoing coronary angioplasty in the U.S. grew
almost tenfold over the past decade, from fewer than 30,000 nationwide in 1983 to more than
285,000 in 1990, while the number of coronary artery bypass grafts more than doubled in the
same period (see Grayboys et al. 1992).
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and racial differences in the use of health care services, without comesponding differences in patient outcomes. In particular, recent studies
of several surgical procedures (e.g ., cardiac catheterization, carotid endarterectomy, coronary angiography) by Chassin et al. (1987), Grayboys
et al. (1992), and others found that many surgical procedures were either
“inappropriate” or of “uncertain” clinical value. Such studies, and the
public’s interest in them, are likely to accelerate in the future, as states
follow the lead of Pennsylvania’s Health Care Cost Containment Council,
which has published outcomes data from each of the state’s acute care
hospitals since 1989.4Oregon recently passed legislation to link the approval of new capital projects to an institution’s patient outcomes. Under
the new criteria, an institution must demonstrate sufficient patient volume
for proposed services, so that “if a new transplant center is proposed, or
if a medical facility wants to buy magnetic resonance imaging equipment,
questions will be asked about whether the patient base will support it, and
whether its purchase will affect patient outcomes” (Alter and Holtzman
1992: 20).
Oregon’s example points the way toward a new role for state CON
programs in what Relman (1988: 1220) dubs the “third revolution in
medical care.” While health planners’ initial definition of the “need”
for new facilities was both vague and imprecise, the growing literature
on the appropriate utilization of health services offers concrete clinical
standards to regulators, with which they can evaluate applications. Using
recent studies as a benchmark, state regulators are already beginning to
apply the guidelines developed by outcomes researchers in evaluating
CON applications based on the appropriate utilization of existing services. Recent studies show that the utilization of cardiac catheterizations,
coronary angioplasties, and other specialized diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures in recent years is driven, at least in part, by the process of
reimbursement, because payer status (whether the patients have private
insurance or Medicaid or will themselves pay) is strongly associated with
patients’ use of health services (Wenneker et al. 1990).Wennberg (1987)
notes that the steady growth in the number of specialists trained in invasive technologies has contributed to continued inflation in the per capita
cost of health care. The CON process may be used to identify potentially
4. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) recently decided to incorporate patient outcome measures and other quality-of-care indicators into
its accreditation criteria over the next decade. In addition, New York’s Commissioner of Health,
Mark Chassin, recently proposed linking hospital reimbursement to quality-of-care measures in
the 1993 renegotiation of the state’s prospective hospital reimbursement system (Darby 1993: 1).
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unnecessary and expensive facilities and discourage the overutilization of
specialized procedures when there is evidence that the proposed services
have no significant impact on patient outcomes.
CON and Public Accountability

Despite its limitations in controlling systemwide costs, CON review remains one of the few institutional forums for public participation in health
policy decision making. As Charles and DeMaio note, citizen participation in planning and allocating health services and facilities provides an
institutional arrangement to “increase public accountability for decisions
on the allocation of health care resources, in order to make providers more
accountable to the communities that they serve.” While citizens’ ability
to influence policy choices are limited by the imbalance of resources between health providers and lay participants (Morone and Marmor 1981),
the CON process offers payers, legislators, and other nonproviders a
“foot in the door” to assess the need for new facilities and services. In
this respect, regardless of the limitations of capital expenditure review
for controlling health care costs, state CON programs have an important
role as a public forum to provide public input into health care policymaking. Since decisions affecting the price and availability of health care
services emerge as the byproduct of a quasi corporatist bargaining process (Hackey 1992; Bergthold 1988), in the absence of other institutional
arrangements, the CON process allows for public comment on proposed
health care resource allocation decisions at meetings which are open to
the public.
Conclusion

Two decades after they first appeared on a wide scale, state CON programs are poised to assume new roles in the 1990s. Relieved of their
unrealistic role as the principal means of controlling health care costs,
CON programs have found new niches since the expiration of federal
health-planning legislation in 1986. In particular, the proliferation of new
medical technologies provides a constant reminder that in the absence
of regulatory controls, new diagnostic and therapeutic services will continue to provide health providers with an incentive to boost revenues by
increasing the volume of specialized services. While a number of states
imposed moratoria on the construction of new health care facilities after
1987 (Young 1991), such an approach is a blunt tool for controlling the
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diffusion of new technologies, since it does not discriminate between
projects with proven clinical benefits and less essential proposals. In contrast, while CON programs have been criticized for discouraging innovation, reforms to the review process in Rhode Island and other states
demonstrate that it is possible for state regulators to assume a proactive
role in capital expenditure reviews by issuing requests for proposals for
identified areas of need. Despite its limitations, CON remains one of the
few tools policymakers have at their disposal to evaluate the need for new
facilities, using objective criteria, and to encourage the regionalization of
health care services.
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